The Great War and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia: The Legacy of an Enduring Conflict by Bakić, Dragan
BELGRADE 2018
XLIX 2018
INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES
SERBIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS
BALCANICA
ISSN 0350-7653
eISSN 2406-0801UDC 930.85(4-12)
ANNUAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES
Y. MOURÉLOS, Le Front d’Orient dans la Grande Guerre: enjeux et 
stratégies • A. D’ALESSANDRI, Italian Volunteers in Serbia in 1914 • 
M. KOVIĆ, The British Adriatic Squadron and the Evacuation of Serbs 
from the Albanian Coast 1915–1916 • M. MILKIĆ, The Serbian Army 
in the Chalkidiki in 1916: Organization and Deployment • D. FUNDIĆ, 
The Austro-Hungarian Occupation of Serbia as a “Civilizing Mission” 
(1915–1918) • S. N. DORDANAS, German Propaganda in the Balkans 
during the First World War • D. CAIN, Conflicts over Dobruja during 
the Great War • T. KREMPP PUPPINCK, De la Grèce rêvée à la 
Grèce vécue. L’armée d’Orient dans une interculturalité complexe • V. G. 
PAVLOVIĆ, Franchet d’Espèrey et la politique balkanique de la France 
1918–1919 • S. G. MARKOVICH, EleftheriosVenizelos, British Public 
Opinion and the Climax of Anglo-Hellenism (1915–1920) • D. BAKIĆ, 
The Great War and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia: The Legacy of an Enduring 
Conflict • I. D. MICHAILIDIS, A Ten Years’ War: Aspects of the Greek 
Historiography on the First World War • R. THEODORESCU, What 
Exactly did Romanian Post-War Nationalism Mean? • V. VLASIDIS, The 
Serbian Heritage of the Great War in Greece • F. ŢURCANU, Turtucaia/
Toutrakan 1916 : la postérité d’une défaite dans la Roumanie de l’entre-
deux-guerres • E. LEMONIDOU, Heritage and Memory of the First 
World War in Greece during the Interwar Period: A Historical Perspective 
• D. DUŠANIĆ, Du traumatisme au roman. Mémoire et représentation 
de la Grande Guerre dans l’œuvre de Rastko Petrović (1898–1949) g
http://www.balcanica.rs
Dragan Bakić*
Institute for Balkan Studies
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Belgrade
The Great War and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
The Legacy of an Enduring Conflict
Abstract: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, officially named Yugoslavia after 
1929, came into being on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 after the immense war 
efforts and sacrifices endured by Serbia. The experience of anti-Habsburg struggle both 
before and after 1914 and the memory of some of the most difficult moments in the Great 
War left a deep imprint on the minds of policy-makers in Belgrade. As they believed that 
many dangers faced in the war were likely to be revived in the future, the impact of these 
experiences was instrumental to their post-war foreign policy and military planning. This 
paper looks at the specific ways in which the legacy of the Great War affected and shaped 
the (planned) responses of the Yugoslav government to certain crises and challenges posed 
to Yugoslavia and the newly-established order in the region. These concern the reaction 
to the two attempts of Habsburg restoration in Hungary in 1921, the importance of the 
Greek port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) for Yugoslavia’s strategic and defence requirements, 
and military planning within the framework of the Little Entente (the defensive alliance 
between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania) in the early 1930s. In addition, it is ar-
gued here that the legacy of Serbo-Croat differences during the war relating to the manner 
of their unification was apparent in the political struggle between Serbs and Croats during 
the two decades of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s existence.        
Keywords: Great War, Yugoslavia, legacy, Habsburg restoration, Salonica (Thessaloniki), 
military planning, Serbo-Croat conflict 
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (officially called Yugoslavia af-ter 1929, although the Yugoslav name was used even earlier for both the 
state and the South Slavs) was one of the successor states that rose from the ash-
es of the Habsburg Monarchy at the end of the Great War.1 Essentially formed 
by victorious Serbia, although it included former parts of Austria-Hungary, the 
newly-fledged country rested on the Serbian tradition of anti-Habsburg strug-
gle that preceded the Great War. However, Yugoslavia was perhaps the most 
* dragan.bakic@bi.sanu.ac.rs
1 For a long view of the creation of Yugoslavia see M. Ekmečić, Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790–
1918, 2 vols (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1989); D. Djordjević, ed., The Creation of Yugoslavia (Santa 
Barbara: Clio Books, 1980); D. T. Bataković, “The Balkan Piedmont. Serbia and the Yugoslav 
Question”, Dialogue 10 (1994), 25–73.    
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complex country in Europe in terms of her ethnic and religious structure, as well 
as cultural and economic diversity. This was the legacy of the two vanquished 
empires, the Habsburg and the Ottoman, in whose place Yugoslavia emerged 
in the Balkans. The vestiges of Austria-Hungary, together with the precarious 
international situation in interwar Europe, in which Yugoslavia was especially 
exposed as it was surrounded with the revanchist neighbours, ensured that the 
long shadow of the Great War was cast on the Yugoslav Kingdom throughout its 
existence. This was equally true in the realm of foreign policy, military planning 
and internal politics, especially in relation to the Serbo-Croat conflict, in which 
the memory of the war and the lessons it offered left a deep imprint. It is the 
purpose of this paper to look more closely at the ways in which the legacy of the 
war haunted Yugoslav, particularly Serbian, policy-makers and how they dealt 
with the challenges it posed.    
The most obvious danger to Yugoslavia and the newly-established order 
in Danubian Europe came from the possibility of a Habsburg restoration, which 
did not seem altogether unrealistic in the wake of the war. This peril was linked 
with Hungarian irredentism and revanchist aspirations. The Treaty of Trianon 
was not signed before 4 June 1920 and the Hungarian ruling circles denounced 
the dismemberment of the lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. Yugoslavia was 
unsettled with sizeable Magyar and German national minorities that would be 
naturally attracted to a Habsburg monarchy to which, after all, they had pledged 
their allegiance for centuries. All other malcontents, especially separatists in 
Croatia, could also rally under the Habsburg banner to further their aims.2 In 
the spring of 1919, the Yugoslav delega tion at the Paris peace conference refused 
the demand of the Entente Powers to contribute troops to sup press the Bolshe-
vist revolution in Hungary, since they suspected a plot to restore the Habsburgs 
and revive some sort of a dual Austro-Hungarian state. Nikola Pašić, the most 
prominent Serbian statesman and head of the delegation, was adamant that to 
assist such a development in Hungary would be a “colossal sin that would de-
stroy our unity and freedom”.3 In early 1920, there seemed to be a real danger 
of an attempt to reinstate the Archduke Joseph Habsburg, and Belgrade and 
Prague joined forces to bring pressure to bear on the Entente Powers to prevent 
it. On 2 February 1920, the Allied Ambassadors in Paris accepted the resolution 
2 B. Hrabak, “Frankovačka emigrantska secesionistička organizacija i Hrvatska legija u 
Madjarskoj (1919–1921)”, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 56 (1997), 97–123.   
3 M. Milošević and B. Dimitrijević, Nikola Pašić – Predsedniku vlade, strogo poverljivo, lično, 
Pariz, 1919–1920: Pašićeva pisma sa konferencije mira (Zaječar: Zadužbina “Nikola Pašić,” 
2005), doc. 20. Delegation to Prime Minister, str. conf. no. 13, 14 April 1919; for a discussion 
of the Habsburg problem see A. Mitrović, Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira 1919–1920 (Bel-
grade: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika, 1969), 186–192.   
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stating that the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty would be “neither recog-
nised nor tolerated” by the Allied Powers.4 
The ex-emperor of Austria-Hungary, Karl I Habsburg – who had reigned 
in Hungary as King Károly IV – was in exile in Switzerland and he intended to 
reclaim his throne. It was with a view to preventing a Habsburg restoration and 
safeguarding the status quo that Czechoslovakia and Yugosla via signed on 14 Au-
gust 1920 a defensive treaty directed against Hungary, thus initiating the alliance 
which came to be known as the Little Entente. Italy and Yugoslavia concluded 
their own anti-Habsburg convention which formed part of the Rapallo Treaty, 
setting down the frontiers between the two countries.5 The Little Entente soon 
came to be tested when on 24 March 1921 Karl Habsburg sneaked out of his 
exile and reached Hungary via Austria. The escapade was met by a firm attitude 
on the part of Pašić who embarked on an energetic action in order to evict Karl 
from Hungary. He immediately proposed to Czechoslovakia, Romania and Italy 
to make a joint demarche in Budapest to the effect that their ministers would 
be recalled from Hungary if Karl did not leave the country; to jointly request 
from France and Britain to support their action in Budapest; and to lodge a 
protest in Bern because it allowed Karl to endanger European peace.6 How-
ever, the Hungarian Regent, Miklós Hor thy, persuaded the ex-emperor to leave 
Hungary, which the latter eventually did under the protection of officers of the 
Entente Powers. 
Karl’s adventure had an important and lasting consequence insofar as 
Ro mania joined the Little Entente: she signed an agreement with Czechoslova-
kia just eighteen days after Karl’s expulsion from Hungary (23 April). On 7 
June 1921, Pašić and the Romanian Prime Minister, Take Ionescu, concluded 
an agreement on the same lines in Belgrade. As Pašić put it to Beneš, this was 
“a significant accomplishment the purpose of which is to maintain peace and 
secure the peace treaties which are the foundation of the future of our coun-
4 Documents on British Foreign Policy, ed. E. L. Woodward and R. Butler (London: HMSO, 
1946–), ser. I, vol. XII, no. 80, Derby to Curzon, Paris, 2 February 1920; the text of the reso-
lution is appended.   
5 C. Sforza, Diplomatic Europe since the Treaty of Versailles (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1928), 101–102; I. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: a Study in Frontier-
making (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), 307.  
6 Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter AJ], Belgrade, London Legation, 341, 
folder I, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Prague, Rome and Bucharest Legations [for-
warded to London Legation], 2 April 1921, conf. no. 4130; for an account of the Habsburg 
restoration attempts see Dj. Knežević, “Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca i dva neuspela 
pokušaja restauracije Habsburga 1921. godine”, Vojnoistori jski glasnik 18/1 (1967), 117–138, 
and V. Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Madjarska 1918–1933 (Bel grade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 
1971), 153–160.   
http://www.balcanica.rs
Balcanica XLIX (2018)160
tries”.7 However, on 21 October 1921, Karl and the ex-empress Zita flew to 
Hungary, gathered some loyal troops and again descended on Budapest. Horthy 
reacted with force and stopped him after a minor skirmish on the outskirts of 
the capital. The Little Entente reacted even more decisively than in March and 
mobilization was or dered and implemented in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
though not in Roma nia. The Conference of Ambassadors struck a balance be-
tween Hungary and her neighbours: Budapest was requested to declare all the 
Habsburgs barred from wearing the crown of St. Stephen and the Little Entente 
to refrain from military measures. In early November, the Hungarian National 
Assembly passed a law that excluded the House of Habsburg from the throne. 
Karl was removed from Hungary on a British vessel and later interned on the 
Portuguese island of Madeira where he died in April 1922. But the prospect of 
a Habsburg restoration not just in Hungary, but also in Austria continued to 
daunt Yugoslavia and her allies. As late as December 1936, the Yugoslav govern-
ment suspected that preparations for that purpose were underway in Vienna 
under the aegis of Italy and Vatican.8 Indeed, the Habsburg issue was regularly 
discussed in foreign ministries of the Great Powers and remained a matter of 
diplomatic exchanges for the rest of interwar period, but it never again created 
such an acute crisis. 
Another controversy in Yugoslav foreign and military policy that essen-
tially derived from the painful experience of the Great War concerned the rela-
tions with friendly Greece. Athens was anxious that Yugoslavia might seek an 
outlet to the Aegean Sea by taking from her the port of Salonica (Thessaloniki), 
whether alone or in conjunction with Bulgaria. The Yugoslav demand for a free 
commercial zone in Salonica with extensive rights that infringed on the Greek 
sovereignty was a major theme behind Belgrade’s denouncing the 1913 pact of 
friendship with Greece in 1924 ‒ it would be resumed five years later. In reality, 
Yugoslav interest in Salonica was grounded in strategic considerations rather 
than economic necessity and it concerned defense requirements unrelated to 
any alleged plans for territorial aggrandizement. The importance of Salonica in 
Yugoslav strategic thinking stemmed from the re treat that the Serbian Army 
had had to undertake in the fall of 1915 after having been exposed to the com-
bined offensive of the much stronger Austro-Hun garian, German and Bulgarian 
forces. As it became clear that the army would have to retreat from Serbian terri-
tory or capitulate, the plan was to withdraw southwards down the Vardar valley 
and join the Franco-British troops which had oc cupied Salonica and its sur-
7 AJ, London Legation, 341, folder 1, confidential archive for 1921, Pašić to Gavrilović, 8 
June 1921, conf. no. 7222; also Pašić to Gavrilović, 31 May 1921, str. conf. no. 486; Gavrilović 
to Pašić, 3 June 1921, no number.    
8 AJ, London Legation, 1936, I-4 (Austria, Hungary), Stojadinović to Grujić, 25 December 
1936, str. conf. no. 2063/V. 
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roundings.9 The Bulgarian attack in the rear cut off the envisaged fallback route 
and compelled the Serbian army, accompanied by considerable number of civil-
ians, to retreat over the inhospitable Alba nian mountains under difficult winter 
conditions. The Serbs suffered horrific losses until they had reached the coast 
and had been transported by the Allied ship ping to the island of Corfu. This 
traumatic collective memory was termed the “Albanian Calvary” and remained 
alive in the minds of policy-makers after the war. The recuperated Serbian Army 
launched, along with its French and British allies, an offensive from Salonica 
which ended not just in the libera tion of Serbia, but was also a decisive cam-
paign of the war as it forced both Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary to capitulate.
The prominent Yugoslav diplomat and later minister at the Court, Milan 
Antić, succinctly explained the importance of the fighting at Salonica for both 
the past and the future: “The Salonica front in the First World War left such a 
deep impression … in our army that it became an integral part of our struggle 
for liberation and unification and its history. Salonica entered into strategy and 
became an integral part of operational necessity of our army in defence of the 
country.”10 Such an impact was amplified by the strategic position of the new 
Yugoslavia which was surrounded from the west, north and east by hostile or 
potentially inimical revisionist neighbours. The only frontiers that seemed safe 
were those with the allied Romania and Greece. In addition, as early as dur-
ing the Paris Peace Conference, Italy, the most dangerous neighbour, made sus-
tained eff orts, later to be continued and crowned with success, to entrench itself 
in Albania at Yugoslavia’s flank.11 From the strategic point of view the Yugoslavs 
were frightened of the peril of the Italians linking from Albania with the Bul-
garians across the Vardar valley in Serb Macedonia, thus cut ting off the vital 
Belgrade–Salonica railway in much the same fashion as the Bulgarian army had 
done in 1915. This consideration was central to Yu goslav military planning. At 
the time of considerable tension in relations with Rome, Major Antoine Bé-
thouart, French military attaché in Belgrade, was told by the assistants of the 
chief of the Yugoslav General Staff that neutralisation of Bulgaria would be a 
primary goal of the army in case of a general war, even at the price of a tem-
porary withdrawal at the western front against Italy. Another military attaché, 
Colonel Moritz von Faber du Faur from Germany, was of opinion on the eve 
of the Second World War that Yugoslavia viewed Greece as a bridge to Britain 
9 A. Mitrović, Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1984), 
252–253. 
10 Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti [Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts; hereafter ASANU], Belgrade, Milan Antić Papers, 14387/8662, undated Antić’s 
note. 
11 D. Bakić, “The Italo-Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939”, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 25/4 (2014), 592–612. 
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which she did not want to burn and it was this consideration that informed 
the attitude towards Salonica.12 He was no doubt accurate in his assessment 
of the Yugoslav frame of mind. Aleksandar Cincar-Marković, Yugoslav foreign 
minister, argued in mid-February 1941 that it was better for Yugoslavia to fight 
the Germans than to let them have Salonica in which case they would “strangle 
us completely”.13 It was Belgrade’s strategic preoccupation with the Greek port 
that lay behind negotiations with Germany about Salonica in 1941 with a view 
to preventing other powers to take it from Greece and block Yugoslavia’s access 
to the Aegean Sea.  
The notion of another general European war modelled on that of 1914–
1918, which seemed increasingly likely to Belgrade in the 1930s, was also central 
to military planning against Hungary ‒ and Bulgaria ‒ within the framework of 
the Little Entente. On 11 May 1931, the Little Entente countries concluded a 
new tripartite military convention at Bucharest, which replaced all previous con-
ventions and their annexes and modifications.14 This document also introduced 
a substantial change in the planned reaction of the Little Entente to potential 
Hungarian aggression. While heretofore no preparatory measures had been 
contemplated prior to a Hungarian attack on a member-state, the new conven-
tion went so far as to call for mobilization in anticipation of military action on 
the part of the enemy. This change was brought about by a new frame of mind 
in which the Hungarian danger was perceived in an entirely different context. 
Whereas during the 1920s conflict with the Magyars was considered a local af-
fair, the grim outlook in Europe in the early 1930s suggested the possibility of 
a European war. Should that be the case, Hungary would naturally be expected 
to come down on the side of a German-led revisionist bloc but she would not 
present the main threat to the Little Entente. She would rather be a nuisance 
launching an attack to the rear of the Little Entente forces, the vast majority of 
which would be engaged elsewhere. In the view of the Little Entente’s military 
planners, such a contingency dictated a rapid full-scale attack that would knock 
Hungary out of war and enable the three allied countries to concentrate all their 
available troops against other more powerful enemies.  
Simultaneously with the tripartite military convention, a new military 
convention between Yugoslavia and Romania dealing with the Bulgarian danger 
was concluded and annexed to the former instrument (ratified on 14 October 
1932).15 The conventions were supplemented with operational plans designed to 
12 D. Bakić, “The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy, 1919–1941”, Balcanica XLIII 
(2012), 197.    
13 Ibid. 211–212.    
14 M. Vanku, Mala Antanta 1920–1938 (Titovo Užice: Dimitrije Tucović, 1969), 358–361. 
15 Vojni arhiv [Military Archives; hereafter VA], Belgrade, register 17 [Army of the King-
dom of Yugoslavia], box 105, folder 4, doc. 12. 
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meet different contingencies. The first plan was devised to respond to a Hungar-
ian attack on Romania while the other two allies were not engaged elsewhere; 
the second one, between Yugoslavia and Romania, provided for coordinated ac-
tion against Bulgaria were she to menace either country.16 In addition, a detailed 
plan was drawn up in case of a combined attack on the part of Hungary and 
Bulgaria on Romania.17 Once again, the assumption was that the conflagration 
would become a general one, and the aim was to defeat first the Magyars and 
then the Bulgarians, thus allowing a free hand for action on other fronts. The 
urgency of preparation for armed conflict seemed to be all the greater in light of 
the erroneous conviction that the other side had already reached a formal under-
standing for joint action. The Yugoslav military attaché in Budapest assured his 
superiors in Belgrade that a military alliance of some sort had been concluded 
between Hungary and Italy following Dino Grandi’s, Italian foreign minister’s, 
visit to Budapest and the return visit to Rome of General Gyula Gömbös, the 
Hungarian Defence Minister, in 1929.18 This assumption was commonly held to 
be true among the diplomatic corps in Budapest because close relations existed 
between the two General Staffs. The latest preoccupations of the Little Entente’s 
military commanders reached their logical denouement at the Prague meet-
ing of 14 December 1931 in the drafting of the first war plan for a full-blown 
general conflict on the pattern of the Great War.19 The work of the General 
Staffs’ representatives was continued in Belgrade where another two versions 
of general conflict plans were adopted on 17 November 1932. The worst-case 
scenario for Belgrade envisaged a simultaneous attack on Yugoslavia by Italy, 
Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria, together with Soviet and Bulgarian aggression 
on Romania and an Austro-German offensive against Czechoslovakia. Another 
plan assumed Bulgarian neutrality, while Hungary would attack Yugoslavia in-
stead of Czechoslovakia.20 All this meticulous contingency planning eventually 
amounted to nothing, but it clearly demonstrated that the military leadership of 
16 VA, register 17, box 105, folder 4, doc. 14 and 15 respectively. Both scenarios were deemed 
highly unlikely except as an attempt to provoke a wider conflict.  
17 VA, register 17, box 105, folder 4, doc. 16. 
18 AJ, Bucharest Legation, 395-22-220, confidential no. 22389, subject: Checking news of a 
military alliance between Italy and Hungary, Political Department of the Foreign Ministry 
to Minister, 12 November 1930. 
19 VA, register 17, box 105, folder 4, doc. 20. Hypothetical situation presaged in “Projet No 1 
CG [Conflit Generale]”: Czechoslovakia was being attacked by Germany, Austria and Hun-
gary, while Yugoslavia was being invaded by Italy, Albania and Bulgaria, and Romania by the 
Soviet Union and Bulgaria. 
20 VA, register 17, box 106, folder 1, doc. 6, “Projet No 3 CG” and doc. 7, “Projet No 2 CG” 
respectively. See doc. 2 in the same folder for a protocol on delimitation of the three occupa-
tion zones that were to be used to carve Hungary up in case of war. 
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Yugoslavia, just like those of Czechoslovakia and Romania, regarded the repeti-
tion of an armed conflict with their former enemies highly likely and spared no 
effort to meet it prepared.  
As for the internal struggle between the Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia, it 
has been noted that it was essentially “an issue of the Jacobin state versus the old 
Habsburg constitutional complexity of historic units”.21 The Serbs had lived in 
their independent national and unitary state for decades before the First World 
War (since the 1878 Congress of Berlin) and saw no reason to change that in 
a new state which was predicated on the national unity of South Slavs (Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes) expressed through slogans “one people with three names” 
or “the three tribes of the same [Yugoslav] nation”, reflecting their common eth-
nic origins and language ‒ as opposed to religious differences. For them, the 
complex constitutional solutions advocated by Zagreb smacked too much of the 
hated and dismantled Austria-Hungary and were not compatible with the no-
tion of a strong and powerful state. In contrast, the Croats had been part of the 
multinational Habsburg monarchy for centuries and used to having their status 
arranged through negotiations and contracts such as that of 1868 concluded be-
tween them and the Hungarians (Nagodba) on the pattern of the Compromise 
between the Austrians and Hungarians concluded a year earlier. In their deal-
ings with Budapest and Vienna, the Croats had based their autonomous status 
on the concept of Croatian state right, an equivalent of the Hungarian historical 
claim to the lands of St. Stephen that took no account of ethnic structure of the 
territories that Hungary comprised. Regardless of the fact that much of Croa-
tian historical and state rights were, in fact, nominal and that the Croatian Diet 
(Sabor) had dissolved itself prior to the creation of Yugoslavia, political elites 
from Zagreb clung to their concept of Croatia’s status in a common state with 
the Serbs.       
A cleavage in the vision of a prospective Yugoslav state was apparent dur-
ing the First World War and it was reflected in a clash between the Serbian 
government headed by Pašić and the Yugoslav Committee, an organization of 
the Yugoslav exiles from Austria-Hungary. It was Pašić who initiated the forma-
tion of the Yugoslav Committee, which he envisaged as a purely propaganda 
bureau that was supposed to facilitate the achievement of a Yugoslav union, 
Serbia’s proclaimed war goal after December 1914. He also financed the activi-
ties of émigrés gathered in the committee, with the notable exception of two 
Croat politicians from Dalmatia, Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić. However, 
these two Croats were the leading members of the Yugoslav Committee and 
held their own distinct views on the constitutional arrangement of a prospective 
Yugoslav state that was supposed to preserve the autonomous rights of Croa-
21 S. Trifković, “The First Yugoslavia and Origins of Croatian Separatism”, East European 
Quarterly 26/3 (1992), 355. 
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tia.22 Although Supilo died during the war, Trumbić was the president and most 
influential member of the committee, and he gradually came to oppose the of-
ficial Serbian policy embodied in Pašić. In July 1917, the Serbian government 
and the Yugoslav Committee held a conference on the Greek soil and issued 
the well-known Corfu declaration that confirmed their dedication to the for-
mation of a Yugoslav state, whereas details of constitutional arrangement were 
left to be resolved later by a constitutional assembly. This glossed over the dif-
ferences that existed between Pašić and Trumbić for the sake of presenting a 
united front against Italian pretensions on the Slovene- and Croat-populated 
lands and impressing the Entente Powers.23 It is interesting to note that even the 
name of Yugoslavia was a matter of contention, since the Croats favoured it on 
the grounds that it emphasised the Yugoslav as opposed to an exclusively Serb 
character of a future state. Pašić and his Radicals, on the contrary, took a dim 
view of the Yugoslav name as it echoed the Austrian concept of Yugoslav unity 
within the trialist framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. This practically meant 
that the unification of Yugoslavs in Austria-Hungary would be carried out con-
trary to Serbia’s ambitions and goals, even in respect of the Serb population 
outside Serbia. Therefore, the Serbian Radical government frowned upon such 
name as being an Austrian brainchild “directed against the Serb name”.24 Fear-
ing Serbia’s predominance, Trumbić and his supporters came into open conflict 
with Pašić in 1918 and advocated something of a dual confederation under the 
Karadjordjević dynasty, in which pre-war Serbia and the Yugoslav lands of the 
former Habsburg Monarchy would be two equal constituent units. This was 
the background against which the Geneva declaration was made in November 
1918 resulting from a conference between Pašić and the representatives of the 
newly-formed National Council from Zagreb, a revolutionary government of 
the Yugoslav-populated Habsburg lands, Serbian opposition parties and the Yu-
goslav Committee. Having been isolated, Pašić was forced on that occasion to 
accept the requests of the Yugoslav Committee in order to preserve the appear-
ance of Yugoslav unity before the Entente Powers and European public opinion. 
He accepted the principles of an essentially confederal constitution, which was a 
negation of his own unitary conceptions.25 But ministers in his government re-
22 A. Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pašić and Yugoslavia (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1974); Dj. Stanković, Nikola Pašić i jugoslovensko pitanje, 2 vols (Belgrade: BIGZ, 
1985). 
23 D. Janković, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krf ska deklaracija 1917. godine (Beograd: Savremena 
administracija, 1967). 
24 Krfska konferencija (Belgrade: Štamparija “Skerlić”, 1934), 82, 84.
25 B. Krizman, “Ženevska konferencija o ujedinjenju 1918. godine”, Istorijski glasnik 1–2 
(1958), 3–32; D. Janković, “Ženevska konferencija o stvaranju jugoslovenske zajed nice 1918. 
godine”, Istorija XX veka 5 (1963), 225–262, and “Još o Ženevskoj konferenciji o stvaranju 
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signed in protest and thus invalidated the Geneva agreement. It was the Serbian 
military victory and the prospect of annexation of large parts of Croat territory 
by Italian troops that decided the matter and brought about the Yugoslav unifi-
cation on 1 December 1918 under the Serbian terms. 
During the peace conference in Paris, the Serbs and Croats in the Yu-
goslav delegation presented a united front, despite their occasional frictions, in 
order to secure the best possible territorial settlement. The conflict continued 
nevertheless with the Croat opposition to the centralist St. Vitus (Vidovdan) 
constitution of 1921 both before and after its adoption. The Croat opposition 
took the shape of passive resistance of the Croat Peasant Party (CPP), which be-
came a virtual Croat national movement led by mercurial Stjepan Radić, to the 
very existence of a unitary Yugoslavia.26 In 1925, Radić came to an agreement 
with the Pašić government and it seemed that Serbo-Croat internecine strife had 
been finally brought to an end. However, Radić’s death at the hands of a Serbian 
member of parliament in 1928 led to Croats’ abandoning state institutions and 
disputing once again the legitimacy of a unitary Yugoslavia. The introduction of 
King Alexander’s dictatorship next year and the imposition of integral Yugoslav-
ism, an ideology aimed at supressing Serb, Croat and Slovene national identity 
alike, only exacerbated the situation in the country. Radić’s successor, Vladimir 
Maček, refused any cooperation with the government in the existing constitu-
tional framework: he wanted a highly autonomous status of Croatia within Yu-
goslavia, or alternatively an independent Croatia.27 On 7 November 1932, the 
Croat opposition issued the Zagreb Points (Zagrebačke punktacije) that called 
for the return to the pre-constitutional situation of 1918 from which a negoti-
ated settlement between the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would determine the 
internal composition of the country. The resolution vaguely mentioned “the as-
sociation of interests” based on the freely expressed will of the constituent units. 
Trumbić, the author of the text and now formally a member of the CPP, claimed 
that such a state would not be a federation, “even such as Switzerland”.28 Clearly, 
the Croat demands increased radically and surpassed those made by Trumbić 
and Supilo during the war; they most resembled a kind of personal union in 
which constituent parts of the country would be nearly independent and only 
jugoslovenske zajednice 1918, godine”, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Novom Sadu 3–4 
(1966), 247–264; M. Stefanovski, “Nikola Pašić na Ženevskoj konferenciji 1918. godine”, in 
Nikola Pašić: život i delo (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 1997), 331–354.
26 B. Hrabak, “Stjepan Radić i HPSS 1918–1920. godine”, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju 
59/60 (1999), 71–105. 
27 Lj. Boban, Maček i politika Hrvatske seljačke stranke, 1928–1941: iz povijesti hrvatskog pitanja, 
2 vols (Zagreb: Liber and Rijeka: Otokar Keršovani, 1974). 
28 Lj. Boban, “Geneza, značenje i odjek Zagrebačkih punktacija”, Časopis za suvremenu pov-
ijest 1 (1971), 153–209. 
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a few, carefully limited functions be left to the central government in Belgrade. 
This political platform had the air of a confederal structure of the defunct Aus-
tria-Hungary which reflected the mentality and traditions of Croat political par-
ties. For that reason, it was deeply distasteful to Serbians who regarded it as an 
undoing of their military victory and a request to abandon the Serbs of Croa-
tia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to Zagreb. To be true, the Serbian-dominated 
governments never showed themselves capable of at least trying to initiate some 
compromise solution with the CPP. The Serbian opposition parties did reach 
an understanding with CPP in 1937 and formed the election coalition, but they 
failed to appreciate that for Maček, unlike for themselves, the national question 
was far more important than restoring democratic rule in the country. 
 Following King Alexander’s assassination in Marseilles in 1934, the 
regime of Prince Paul, Regent of Yugoslavia, had to deal with the Croat op-
position in the increasingly volatile international situation. It was Prince Paul’s 
anxiety to consolidate the country at the outbreak of the Second World War 
that led him to give way and reach an agreement with CPP, which resulted in 
the formation of Banovina Hrvatska, a Croat province with extensive autonomy, 
in 1939.29 This was the realisation of Croat demands, including their rather 
excessive territorial ambitions, and it also meant that considerable number of 
Serbs found themselves within the Croatian province. The views of Trumbić 
and other Croat leaders grounded in the experience of a confederal union of 
Austria-Hungary appeared to have triumphed twenty years after the Great War 
and the demise of the Habsburg Empire. A Serbian legal expert remarked that 
the Croats “imagine the relationship between Banovina Croatia and the [Yu-
goslav] state as a relationship between two equal authorities which constantly 
make agreements”.30 This description of the Croats’ attitude of mind regarding 
their status in Yugoslavia clearly shows that they perceived it as stemming from 
another compromise (nagodba) on the pattern of those that had constructed 
Austro-Hungarian political edifice. With such solution of the Croat question, 
it turned out that Serbia failed to achieve even the integral unification of all the 
Serbs, despite the preserved Yugoslav state. It seemed that Serbo-Croat relations 
came full circle: while there had been a consensus in 1918 that the Serbs and 
Croats (and Slovenes) constituted a single Yugoslav nation, which had served to 
justify the creation of Yugoslavia on the nationality principle, the formation of 
Croatian banovina was a return to the notion that they were two separate na-
tions. The Yugoslav interwar experience with nationalities conflict proved to be 
reminiscent of Austria-Hungary’s difficulties to put its house in order. The 1939 
Serbo-Croat agreement offered a prospect for Yugoslavia to settle her thorniest 
29 Lj. Boban, Sporazum Cvetković-Maček (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1965). 
30 M. Konstantinović, Politika sporazuma: dnevničke beleške 1939–1941: londonske beleške 1944–
1945 (Novi Sad: Agencija “Mir”, 1998), 42, 551, 564.  
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issue, but such hopes were not fully justified immediately after establishing of 
the Croatian province due to somewhat provisional character of the settlement. 
What its long-term effects would be, however, can only remain a matter of spec-
ulation, since Yugoslavia’s involvement in the war brought about the destruction 
of that country.           
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